Source file validate.ml
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open Validate_errors
open Alpha_context
type consensus_info = {
predecessor_level : Raw_level.t;
predecessor_round : Round.t;
preattestation_slot_map : (Consensus_key.pk * int * int) Slot.Map.t option;
attestation_slot_map : (Consensus_key.pk * int * int) Slot.Map.t option;
}
let init_consensus_info ctxt (predecessor_level, predecessor_round) =
{
predecessor_level;
predecessor_round;
preattestation_slot_map = Consensus.allowed_preattestations ctxt;
attestation_slot_map = Consensus.allowed_attestations ctxt;
}
(** Map used to detect consensus operation conflicts. Each delegate may
(pre)attest at most once for each level and round, so two attestations
(resp. two DAL attestations or two preattestations) conflict when they have
the same slot, level, and round.
Note that when validating the mempool, several (DAL/pre)attestations by the
same delegate at the same level and round would not conflict if they have
different Tenderbake slots.
Note that when validating a block, all attestations (resp. all
preattestations) must have the same level and round anyway, so only
the slot is relevant. Taking the level and round into account is
useful in mempool mode, because we want to be able to accept and
propagate consensus operations for multiple close
past/future/cousin blocks. *)
module Consensus_conflict_map = Map.Make (struct
type t = Slot.t * Raw_level.t * Round.t
let compare (slot1, level1, round1) (slot2, level2, round2) =
Compare.or_else (Raw_level.compare level1 level2) @@ fun () ->
Compare.or_else (Slot.compare slot1 slot2) @@ fun () ->
Round.compare round1 round2
end)
type consensus_state = {
preattestations_seen : Operation_hash.t Consensus_conflict_map.t;
attestations_seen : Operation_hash.t Consensus_conflict_map.t;
}
let consensus_conflict_map_encoding =
let open Data_encoding in
conv
(fun map -> Consensus_conflict_map.bindings map)
(fun l ->
Consensus_conflict_map.(
List.fold_left (fun m (k, v) -> add k v m) empty l))
(list
(tup2
(tup3 Slot.encoding Raw_level.encoding Round.encoding)
Operation_hash.encoding))
let consensus_state_encoding =
let open Data_encoding in
def "consensus_state"
@@ conv
(fun {preattestations_seen; attestations_seen} ->
(preattestations_seen, attestations_seen))
(fun (preattestations_seen, attestations_seen) ->
{preattestations_seen; attestations_seen})
(obj2
(req "preattestations_seen" consensus_conflict_map_encoding)
(req "attestations_seen" consensus_conflict_map_encoding))
let empty_consensus_state =
{
preattestations_seen = Consensus_conflict_map.empty;
attestations_seen = Consensus_conflict_map.empty;
}
type voting_state = {
proposals_seen : Operation_hash.t Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.t;
(** To each delegate that has submitted a Proposals operation in a
previously validated operation, associates the hash of this
operation. This includes Proposals from a potential Testnet
Dictator. *)
ballots_seen : Operation_hash.t Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.t;
(** To each delegate that has submitted a ballot in a previously
validated operation, associates the hash of this operation. *)
}
let voting_state_encoding =
let open Data_encoding in
def "voting_state"
@@ conv
(fun {proposals_seen; ballots_seen} -> (proposals_seen, ballots_seen))
(fun (proposals_seen, ballots_seen) -> {proposals_seen; ballots_seen})
(obj2
(req
"proposals_seen"
(Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.encoding Operation_hash.encoding))
(req
"ballots_seen"
(Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.encoding Operation_hash.encoding)))
module Double_baking_evidence_map = struct
include Map.Make (struct
type t = Raw_level.t * Round.t
let compare (l, r) (l', r') =
Compare.or_else (Raw_level.compare l l') @@ fun () ->
Compare.or_else (Round.compare r r') @@ fun () -> 0
end)
let encoding elt_encoding =
Data_encoding.conv
(fun map -> bindings map)
(fun l -> List.fold_left (fun m (k, v) -> add k v m) empty l)
Data_encoding.(
list (tup2 (tup2 Raw_level.encoding Round.encoding) elt_encoding))
end
module Double_operation_evidence_map = struct
include Map.Make (struct
type t = Raw_level.t * Round.t * Slot.t * Misbehaviour.kind
let compare (l, r, s, k) (l', r', s', k') =
Compare.or_else (Raw_level.compare l l') @@ fun () ->
Compare.or_else (Round.compare r r') @@ fun () ->
Compare.or_else (Slot.compare s s') @@ fun () ->
Misbehaviour.compare_kind k k'
end)
let encoding elt_encoding =
Data_encoding.conv
(fun map -> bindings map)
(fun l -> List.fold_left (fun m (k, v) -> add k v m) empty l)
Data_encoding.(
list
(tup2
(tup4
Raw_level.encoding
Round.encoding
Slot.encoding
Misbehaviour.kind_encoding)
elt_encoding))
end
(** State used and modified when validating anonymous operations.
These fields are used to enforce that we do not validate the same
operation multiple times.
Note that as part of {!state}, these maps live
in memory. They are not explicitly bounded here, however:
- In block validation mode, they are bounded by the number of
anonymous operations allowed in the block.
- In mempool mode, bounding the number of operations in this map
is the responsability of the prevalidator on the shell side. *)
type anonymous_state = {
activation_pkhs_seen : Operation_hash.t Ed25519.Public_key_hash.Map.t;
double_baking_evidences_seen : Operation_hash.t Double_baking_evidence_map.t;
double_attesting_evidences_seen :
Operation_hash.t Double_operation_evidence_map.t;
seed_nonce_levels_seen : Operation_hash.t Raw_level.Map.t;
vdf_solution_seen : Operation_hash.t option;
}
let raw_level_map_encoding elt_encoding =
let open Data_encoding in
conv
(fun map -> Raw_level.Map.bindings map)
(fun l ->
Raw_level.Map.(List.fold_left (fun m (k, v) -> add k v m) empty l))
(list (tup2 Raw_level.encoding elt_encoding))
let anonymous_state_encoding =
let open Data_encoding in
def "anonymous_state"
@@ conv
(fun {
activation_pkhs_seen;
double_baking_evidences_seen;
double_attesting_evidences_seen;
seed_nonce_levels_seen;
vdf_solution_seen;
} ->
( activation_pkhs_seen,
double_baking_evidences_seen,
double_attesting_evidences_seen,
seed_nonce_levels_seen,
vdf_solution_seen ))
(fun ( activation_pkhs_seen,
double_baking_evidences_seen,
double_attesting_evidences_seen,
seed_nonce_levels_seen,
vdf_solution_seen ) ->
{
activation_pkhs_seen;
double_baking_evidences_seen;
double_attesting_evidences_seen;
seed_nonce_levels_seen;
vdf_solution_seen;
})
(obj5
(req
"activation_pkhs_seen"
(Ed25519.Public_key_hash.Map.encoding Operation_hash.encoding))
(req
"double_baking_evidences_seen"
(Double_baking_evidence_map.encoding Operation_hash.encoding))
(req
"double_attesting_evidences_seen"
(Double_operation_evidence_map.encoding Operation_hash.encoding))
(req
"seed_nonce_levels_seen"
(raw_level_map_encoding Operation_hash.encoding))
(opt "vdf_solution_seen" Operation_hash.encoding))
let empty_anonymous_state =
{
activation_pkhs_seen = Ed25519.Public_key_hash.Map.empty;
double_baking_evidences_seen = Double_baking_evidence_map.empty;
double_attesting_evidences_seen = Double_operation_evidence_map.empty;
seed_nonce_levels_seen = Raw_level.Map.empty;
vdf_solution_seen = None;
}
(** Static information used to validate manager operations. *)
type manager_info = {
hard_storage_limit_per_operation : Z.t;
hard_gas_limit_per_operation : Gas.Arith.integral;
}
let init_manager_info ctxt =
{
hard_storage_limit_per_operation =
Constants.hard_storage_limit_per_operation ctxt;
hard_gas_limit_per_operation = Constants.hard_gas_limit_per_operation ctxt;
}
(** State used and modified when validating manager operations. *)
type manager_state = {
managers_seen : Operation_hash.t Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.t;
(** To enforce the one-operation-per manager-per-block restriction
(1M). The operation hash lets us indicate the conflicting
operation in the {!Manager_restriction} error.
Note that as part of {!state}, this map
lives in memory. It is not explicitly bounded here, however:
- In block validation mode, it is bounded by the number of
manager operations allowed in the block.
- In mempool mode, bounding the number of operations in this
map is the responsability of the mempool. (E.g. the plugin used
by Octez has a [max_prechecked_manager_operations] parameter to
ensure this.) *)
}
let manager_state_encoding =
let open Data_encoding in
def "manager_state"
@@ conv
(fun {managers_seen} -> managers_seen)
(fun managers_seen -> {managers_seen})
(obj1
(req
"managers_seen"
(Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.encoding Operation_hash.encoding)))
let empty_manager_state = {managers_seen = Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.empty}
(** Information needed to validate consensus operations and/or to
finalize the block in both modes that handle a preexisting block:
[Application] and [Partial_validation]. *)
type block_info = {
round : Round.t;
locked_round : Round.t option;
predecessor_hash : Block_hash.t;
header_contents : Block_header.contents;
}
(** Information needed to validate consensus operations and/or to
finalize the block in [Construction] mode. *)
type construction_info = {
round : Round.t;
predecessor_hash : Block_hash.t;
header_contents : Block_header.contents;
}
(** Circumstances in which operations are validated, and corresponding
specific information.
If you add a new mode, please make sure that it has a way to bound
the size of the maps in the {!operation_conflict_state}. *)
type mode =
| Application of block_info
(** [Application] is used for the validation of a preexisting block,
often in preparation for its future application. *)
| Partial_validation of block_info
(** [Partial_validation] is used to quickly but partially validate a
preexisting block, e.g. to quickly decide whether an alternate
branch seems viable. In this mode, the initial {!type:context} may
come from an ancestor block instead of the predecessor block. Only
consensus operations are validated in this mode. *)
| Construction of construction_info
(** Used for the construction of a new block. *)
| Mempool
(** Used by the mempool ({!module:Mempool_validation}) and by the
[Partial_construction] mode in {!module:Main}, which may itself be
used by RPCs or by another mempool implementation. *)
(** {2 Definition and initialization of [info] and [state]} *)
type info = {
ctxt : t; (** The context at the beginning of the block or mempool. *)
mode : mode;
chain_id : Chain_id.t; (** Needed for signature checks. *)
current_level : Level.t;
consensus_info : consensus_info option;
(** Needed to validate consensus operations. This can be [None] during
some RPC calls when some predecessor information is unavailable,
in which case the validation of all consensus operations will
systematically fail. *)
manager_info : manager_info;
}
type operation_conflict_state = {
consensus_state : consensus_state;
voting_state : voting_state;
anonymous_state : anonymous_state;
manager_state : manager_state;
}
let operation_conflict_state_encoding =
let open Data_encoding in
def "operation_conflict_state"
@@ conv
(fun {consensus_state; voting_state; anonymous_state; manager_state} ->
(consensus_state, voting_state, anonymous_state, manager_state))
(fun (consensus_state, voting_state, anonymous_state, manager_state) ->
{consensus_state; voting_state; anonymous_state; manager_state})
(obj4
(req "consensus_state" consensus_state_encoding)
(req "voting_state" voting_state_encoding)
(req "anonymous_state" anonymous_state_encoding)
(req "manager_state" manager_state_encoding))
type block_state = {
op_count : int;
remaining_block_gas : Gas.Arith.fp;
recorded_operations_rev : Operation_hash.t list;
last_op_validation_pass : int option;
locked_round_evidence : (Round.t * int) option;
attestation_power : int;
}
type validation_state = {
info : info;
operation_state : operation_conflict_state;
block_state : block_state;
}
let ok_unit = Result_syntax.return_unit
let result_error = Result_syntax.tzfail
let init_info ctxt mode chain_id ~predecessor_level_and_round =
let consensus_info =
Option.map (init_consensus_info ctxt) predecessor_level_and_round
in
{
ctxt;
mode;
chain_id;
current_level = Level.current ctxt;
consensus_info;
manager_info = init_manager_info ctxt;
}
let empty_voting_state =
{
proposals_seen = Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.empty;
ballots_seen = Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.empty;
}
let empty_operation_conflict_state =
{
consensus_state = empty_consensus_state;
voting_state = empty_voting_state;
anonymous_state = empty_anonymous_state;
manager_state = empty_manager_state;
}
let init_block_state vi =
{
op_count = 0;
remaining_block_gas =
Gas.Arith.fp (Constants.hard_gas_limit_per_block vi.ctxt);
recorded_operations_rev = [];
last_op_validation_pass = None;
locked_round_evidence = None;
attestation_power = 0;
}
let get_initial_ctxt {info; _} = info.ctxt
(** Validation of consensus operations (validation pass [0]):
preattestations and attestations. *)
module Consensus = struct
open Validate_errors.Consensus
let check_delegate_is_not_forbidden ctxt delegate_pkh =
fail_when
(Delegate.is_forbidden_delegate ctxt delegate_pkh)
(Forbidden_delegate delegate_pkh)
let get_delegate_details slot_map kind slot =
let open Result_syntax in
match slot_map with
| None -> tzfail (Consensus.Slot_map_not_found {loc = __LOC__})
| Some slot_map -> (
match Slot.Map.find slot slot_map with
| None -> tzfail (Wrong_slot_used_for_consensus_operation {kind})
| Some x -> return x)
(** When validating a block (ie. in [Application],
[Partial_validation], and [Construction] modes), any
preattestations must point to a round that is strictly before the
block's round. *)
let check_round_before_block ~block_round provided =
error_unless
Round.(provided < block_round)
(Preattestation_round_too_high {block_round; provided})
let check_level kind expected provided =
if Raw_level.equal expected provided then Result.return_unit
else if Raw_level.(expected > provided) then
result_error
(Consensus_operation_for_old_level {kind; expected; provided})
else
result_error
(Consensus_operation_for_future_level {kind; expected; provided})
let check_round kind expected provided =
if Round.equal expected provided then ok_unit
else if Round.(expected > provided) then
result_error
(Consensus_operation_for_old_round {kind; expected; provided})
else
result_error
(Consensus_operation_for_future_round {kind; expected; provided})
let check_payload_hash kind expected provided =
error_unless
(Block_payload_hash.equal expected provided)
(Wrong_payload_hash_for_consensus_operation {kind; expected; provided})
(** Preattestation checks for both [Application] and
[Partial_validation] modes.
Return the slot owner's consensus key and voting power. *)
let check_preexisting_block_preattestation vi consensus_info block_info
{level; round; block_payload_hash = bph; slot} =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let*? locked_round =
match block_info.locked_round with
| Some locked_round -> Ok locked_round
| None ->
error Unexpected_preattestation_in_block
in
let kind = Preattestation in
let*? () = check_round_before_block ~block_round:block_info.round round in
let*? () = check_level kind vi.current_level.level level in
let*? () = check_round kind locked_round round in
let expected_payload_hash = block_info.header_contents.payload_hash in
let*? () = check_payload_hash kind expected_payload_hash bph in
let*? consensus_key, voting_power, _dal_power =
get_delegate_details consensus_info.preattestation_slot_map kind slot
in
return (consensus_key, voting_power)
(** Preattestation checks for Construction mode.
Return the slot owner's consensus key and voting power. *)
let check_constructed_block_preattestation vi consensus_info cons_info
{level; round; block_payload_hash = bph; slot} =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let expected_payload_hash = cons_info.header_contents.payload_hash in
let*? () =
error_when
Block_payload_hash.(expected_payload_hash = zero)
Unexpected_preattestation_in_block
in
let kind = Preattestation in
let*? () = check_round_before_block ~block_round:cons_info.round round in
let*? () = check_level kind vi.current_level.level level in
let*? () = check_payload_hash kind expected_payload_hash bph in
let*? consensus_key, voting_power, _dal_power =
get_delegate_details consensus_info.preattestation_slot_map kind slot
in
return (consensus_key, voting_power)
(** Preattestation/attestation checks for Mempool mode.
We want this mode to be very permissive, to allow the mempool to
accept and propagate consensus operations even if they point to a
block which is not known to the mempool (e.g. because the block
has just been validated and the mempool has not had time to
switch its head to it yet, or because the block belongs to a
cousin branch). Therefore, we do not check the round nor the
payload, which may correspond to blocks that we do not know of
yet. As to the level, we only require it to be the
[predecessor_level] (aka the level of the mempool's head) plus or
minus one, that is:
[predecessor_level - 1 <= op_level <= predecessor_level + 1]
(note that [predecessor_level + 1] is also known as [current_level]).
Note that we also don't check whether the slot is normalized
(that is, whether it is the delegate's smallest slot). Indeed,
we don't want to compute the right tables by first slot for all
three allowed levels. Checking the slot normalization is
therefore the responsability of the baker when it selects
the consensus operations to include in a new block. Moreover,
multiple attestations pointing to the same block with different
slots can be punished by a double-(pre)attestation operation.
Return the slot owner's consensus key and a fake voting power (the
latter won't be used anyway in Mempool mode). *)
let check_mempool_consensus vi consensus_info kind {level; slot; _} =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let*? () =
if Raw_level.(succ level < consensus_info.predecessor_level) then
let expected = consensus_info.predecessor_level and provided = level in
result_error
(Consensus_operation_for_old_level {kind; expected; provided})
else if Raw_level.(level > vi.current_level.level) then
let expected = consensus_info.predecessor_level and provided = level in
result_error
(Consensus_operation_for_future_level {kind; expected; provided})
else ok_unit
in
let* (_ctxt : t), consensus_key =
Stake_distribution.slot_owner vi.ctxt (Level.from_raw vi.ctxt level) slot
in
return (consensus_key, 0 )
let check_preattestation vi ~check_signature
(operation : Kind.preattestation operation) =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let*? consensus_info =
Option.value_e
~error:(trace_of_error Consensus_operation_not_allowed)
vi.consensus_info
in
let (Single (Preattestation consensus_content)) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let* consensus_key, voting_power =
match vi.mode with
| Application block_info | Partial_validation block_info ->
check_preexisting_block_preattestation
vi
consensus_info
block_info
consensus_content
| Construction construction_info ->
check_constructed_block_preattestation
vi
consensus_info
construction_info
consensus_content
| Mempool ->
check_mempool_consensus
vi
consensus_info
Preattestation
consensus_content
in
let* () = check_delegate_is_not_forbidden vi.ctxt consensus_key.delegate in
let*? () =
if check_signature then
Operation.check_signature
consensus_key.consensus_pk
vi.chain_id
operation
else ok_unit
in
return voting_power
let check_preattestation_conflict vs oph (op : Kind.preattestation operation)
=
let (Single (Preattestation {slot; level; round; _})) =
op.protocol_data.contents
in
match
Consensus_conflict_map.find_opt
(slot, level, round)
vs.consensus_state.preattestations_seen
with
| Some existing ->
Error (Operation_conflict {existing; new_operation = oph})
| None -> ok_unit
let wrap_preattestation_conflict = function
| Ok () -> ok_unit
| Error conflict ->
result_error
Validate_errors.Consensus.(
Conflicting_consensus_operation {kind = Preattestation; conflict})
let add_preattestation vs oph (op : Kind.preattestation operation) =
let (Single (Preattestation {slot; level; round; _})) =
op.protocol_data.contents
in
let preattestations_seen =
Consensus_conflict_map.add
(slot, level, round)
oph
vs.consensus_state.preattestations_seen
in
{vs with consensus_state = {vs.consensus_state with preattestations_seen}}
let may_update_locked_round_evidence block_state mode
(consensus_content : consensus_content) voting_power =
let locked_round_evidence =
match mode with
| Mempool -> None
| Application _ | Partial_validation _ | Construction _ -> (
match block_state.locked_round_evidence with
| None -> Some (consensus_content.round, voting_power)
| Some (_stored_round, evidences) ->
Some (consensus_content.round, evidences + voting_power))
in
{block_state with locked_round_evidence}
let remove_preattestation vs (operation : Kind.preattestation operation) =
let (Single (Preattestation {slot; level; round; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let preattestations_seen =
Consensus_conflict_map.remove
(slot, level, round)
vs.consensus_state.preattestations_seen
in
{vs with consensus_state = {vs.consensus_state with preattestations_seen}}
(** Attestation checks for all modes that involve a block:
Application, Partial_validation, and Construction.
Checks regarding the DAL content are done separately.
Return the slot owner's consensus key and voting power. *)
let check_block_attestation vi consensus_info
{level; round; block_payload_hash = bph; slot} =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let*? expected_payload_hash =
match Consensus.attestation_branch vi.ctxt with
| Some ((_branch : Block_hash.t), payload_hash) -> Ok payload_hash
| None ->
result_error Unexpected_attestation_in_block
in
let kind = Attestation in
let*? () = check_level kind consensus_info.predecessor_level level in
let*? () = check_round kind consensus_info.predecessor_round round in
let*? () = check_payload_hash kind expected_payload_hash bph in
let*? consensus_key, voting_power, _dal_power =
get_delegate_details consensus_info.attestation_slot_map kind slot
in
return (consensus_key, voting_power)
let check_attestation vi ~check_signature
(operation : Kind.attestation operation) =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let*? consensus_info =
Option.value_e
~error:(trace_of_error Consensus_operation_not_allowed)
vi.consensus_info
in
let (Single (Attestation {consensus_content; dal_content})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let* consensus_key, voting_power =
match vi.mode with
| Application _ | Partial_validation _ | Construction _ ->
check_block_attestation vi consensus_info consensus_content
| Mempool ->
check_mempool_consensus
vi
consensus_info
Attestation
consensus_content
in
let* () = check_delegate_is_not_forbidden vi.ctxt consensus_key.delegate in
let* () =
Option.fold
~none:return_unit
~some:(fun dal ->
Dal_apply.validate_attestation
vi.ctxt
consensus_content.level
consensus_content.slot
consensus_key
dal.attestation)
dal_content
in
let*? () =
if check_signature then
Operation.check_signature
consensus_key.consensus_pk
vi.chain_id
operation
else ok_unit
in
return voting_power
let check_attestation_conflict vs oph (operation : Kind.attestation operation)
=
let (Single
(Attestation
{consensus_content = {slot; level; round; _}; dal_content = _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
match
Consensus_conflict_map.find_opt
(slot, level, round)
vs.consensus_state.attestations_seen
with
| None -> ok_unit
| Some existing ->
Error (Operation_conflict {existing; new_operation = oph})
let wrap_attestation_conflict = function
| Ok () -> ok_unit
| Error conflict ->
result_error
Validate_errors.Consensus.(
Conflicting_consensus_operation {kind = Attestation; conflict})
let add_attestation vs oph (op : Kind.attestation operation) =
let (Single
(Attestation
{consensus_content = {slot; level; round; _}; dal_content = _})) =
op.protocol_data.contents
in
let attestations_seen =
Consensus_conflict_map.add
(slot, level, round)
oph
vs.consensus_state.attestations_seen
in
{vs with consensus_state = {vs.consensus_state with attestations_seen}}
let may_update_attestation_power vi block_state voting_power =
match vi.mode with
| Mempool -> block_state
| Application _ | Partial_validation _ | Construction _ ->
{
block_state with
attestation_power = block_state.attestation_power + voting_power;
}
let remove_attestation vs (operation : Kind.attestation operation) =
let (Single
(Attestation
{consensus_content = {slot; level; round; _}; dal_content = _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let attestations_seen =
Consensus_conflict_map.remove
(slot, level, round)
vs.consensus_state.attestations_seen
in
{vs with consensus_state = {vs.consensus_state with attestations_seen}}
(** In Construction mode, check that the preattestation has the same
round as any previously validated preattestations.
This check is not needed in other modes because
{!check_preattestation} already checks that all preattestations
have the same expected round (the locked_round in Application and
Partial_validation modes when there is one (otherwise all
preattestations are rejected so the point is moot), or the
predecessor_round in Mempool mode). *)
let check_construction_preattestation_round_consistency vi block_state
(consensus_content : consensus_content) =
let open Result_syntax in
match vi.mode with
| Construction _ -> (
match block_state.locked_round_evidence with
| None ->
return_unit
| Some (expected, _power) ->
check_round Preattestation expected consensus_content.round)
| Application _ | Partial_validation _ | Mempool -> return_unit
let validate_preattestation ~check_signature info operation_state block_state
oph (operation : Kind.preattestation operation) =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let (Single (Preattestation consensus_content)) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let* voting_power = check_preattestation info ~check_signature operation in
let*? () =
check_construction_preattestation_round_consistency
info
block_state
consensus_content
in
let*? () =
check_preattestation_conflict operation_state oph operation
|> wrap_preattestation_conflict
in
let block_state =
may_update_locked_round_evidence
block_state
info.mode
consensus_content
voting_power
in
let operation_state = add_preattestation operation_state oph operation in
return {info; operation_state; block_state}
let validate_attestation ~check_signature info operation_state block_state oph
operation =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let* power = check_attestation info ~check_signature operation in
let*? () =
check_attestation_conflict operation_state oph operation
|> wrap_attestation_conflict
in
let block_state = may_update_attestation_power info block_state power in
let operation_state = add_attestation operation_state oph operation in
return {info; operation_state; block_state}
end
(** {2 Validation of voting operations}
There are two kinds of voting operations:
- Proposals: A delegate submits a list of protocol amendment
proposals. This operation is only accepted during a Proposal period
(see above).
- Ballot: A delegate casts a vote for/against the current proposal
(or pass). This operation is only accepted during an Exploration
or Promotion period (see above). *)
module Voting = struct
open Validate_errors.Voting
let check_period_index ~expected period_index =
error_unless
Compare.Int32.(expected = period_index)
(Wrong_voting_period_index {expected; provided = period_index})
let check_proposals_source_is_registered ctxt source =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let*! is_registered = Delegate.registered ctxt source in
fail_unless is_registered (Proposals_from_unregistered_delegate source)
(** Check that the list of proposals is not empty and does not contain
duplicates. *)
let check_proposal_list_sanity proposals =
let open Result_syntax in
let* () =
match proposals with [] -> tzfail Empty_proposals | _ :: _ -> ok_unit
in
let* (_ : Protocol_hash.Set.t) =
List.fold_left_e
(fun previous_elements proposal ->
let* () =
error_when
(Protocol_hash.Set.mem proposal previous_elements)
(Proposals_contain_duplicate {proposal})
in
return (Protocol_hash.Set.add proposal previous_elements))
Protocol_hash.Set.empty
proposals
in
return_unit
let check_period_kind_for_proposals current_period =
match current_period.Voting_period.kind with
| Proposal -> ok_unit
| (Exploration | Cooldown | Promotion | Adoption) as current ->
result_error (Wrong_voting_period_kind {current; expected = [Proposal]})
let check_in_listings ctxt source =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let*! in_listings = Vote.in_listings ctxt source in
fail_unless in_listings Source_not_in_vote_listings
let check_count ~count_in_ctxt ~proposals_length =
assert (Compare.Int.(count_in_ctxt <= Constants.max_proposals_per_delegate)) ;
error_unless
Compare.Int.(
count_in_ctxt + proposals_length <= Constants.max_proposals_per_delegate)
(Too_many_proposals
{previous_count = count_in_ctxt; operation_count = proposals_length})
let check_already_proposed ctxt proposer proposals =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
List.iter_es
(fun proposal ->
let*! already_proposed = Vote.has_proposed ctxt proposer proposal in
fail_when already_proposed (Already_proposed {proposal}))
proposals
(** Check that the [apply_testnet_dictator_proposals] function in
{!module:Amendment} will not fail.
The current function is designed to be exclusively called by
[check_proposals] right below.
@return [Error Testnet_dictator_multiple_proposals] if
[proposals] has more than one element. *)
let check_testnet_dictator_proposals chain_id proposals =
assert (Chain_id.(chain_id <> Constants.mainnet_id)) ;
match proposals with
| [] | [_] ->
ok_unit
| _ :: _ :: _ -> result_error Testnet_dictator_multiple_proposals
(** Check that a Proposals operation can be safely applied.
@return [Error Wrong_voting_period_index] if the operation's
period and the current period in the {!type:context} do not have
the same index.
@return [Error Proposals_from_unregistered_delegate] if the
source is not a registered delegate.
@return [Error Empty_proposals] if the list of proposals is empty.
@return [Error Proposals_contain_duplicate] if the list of
proposals contains a duplicate element.
@return [Error Wrong_voting_period_kind] if the voting period is
not of the Proposal kind.
@return [Error Source_not_in_vote_listings] if the source is not
in the vote listings.
@return [Error Too_many_proposals] if the operation causes the
source's total number of proposals during the current voting
period to exceed {!Constants.max_proposals_per_delegate}.
@return [Error Already_proposed] if one of the proposals has
already been proposed by the source in the current voting period.
@return [Error Testnet_dictator_multiple_proposals] if the
source is a testnet dictator and the operation contains more than
one proposal.
@return [Error Operation.Missing_signature] or [Error
Operation.Invalid_signature] if the operation is unsigned or
incorrectly signed. *)
let check_proposals vi ~check_signature (operation : Kind.proposals operation)
=
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let (Single (Proposals {source; period; proposals})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let* current_period = Voting_period.get_current vi.ctxt in
let*? () = check_period_index ~expected:current_period.index period in
let* () =
if Amendment.is_testnet_dictator vi.ctxt vi.chain_id source then
let*? () = check_testnet_dictator_proposals vi.chain_id proposals in
return_unit
else
let* () = check_proposals_source_is_registered vi.ctxt source in
let*? () = check_proposal_list_sanity proposals in
let*? () = check_period_kind_for_proposals current_period in
let* () = check_in_listings vi.ctxt source in
let* count_in_ctxt = Vote.get_delegate_proposal_count vi.ctxt source in
let proposals_length = List.length proposals in
let*? () = check_count ~count_in_ctxt ~proposals_length in
check_already_proposed vi.ctxt source proposals
in
if check_signature then
let* public_key = Contract.get_manager_key vi.ctxt source in
Lwt.return (Operation.check_signature public_key vi.chain_id operation)
else return_unit
(** Check that a Proposals operation is compatible with previously
validated operations in the current block/mempool.
@return [Error Operation_conflict] if the current block/mempool
already contains a Proposals operation from the same source
(regardless of whether this source is a testnet dictator or an
ordinary manager). *)
let check_proposals_conflict vs oph (operation : Kind.proposals operation) =
let open Result_syntax in
let (Single (Proposals {source; _})) = operation.protocol_data.contents in
match
Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.find_opt
source
vs.voting_state.proposals_seen
with
| None -> return_unit
| Some existing ->
Error (Operation_conflict {existing; new_operation = oph})
let wrap_proposals_conflict = function
| Ok () -> ok_unit
| Error conflict ->
result_error Validate_errors.Voting.(Conflicting_proposals conflict)
let add_proposals vs oph (operation : Kind.proposals operation) =
let (Single (Proposals {source; _})) = operation.protocol_data.contents in
let proposals_seen =
Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.add
source
oph
vs.voting_state.proposals_seen
in
let voting_state = {vs.voting_state with proposals_seen} in
{vs with voting_state}
let remove_proposals vs (operation : Kind.proposals operation) =
let (Single (Proposals {source; _})) = operation.protocol_data.contents in
let proposals_seen =
Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.remove source vs.voting_state.proposals_seen
in
{vs with voting_state = {vs.voting_state with proposals_seen}}
let check_ballot_source_is_registered ctxt source =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let*! is_registered = Delegate.registered ctxt source in
fail_unless is_registered (Ballot_from_unregistered_delegate source)
let check_period_kind_for_ballot current_period =
match current_period.Voting_period.kind with
| Exploration | Promotion -> ok_unit
| (Cooldown | Proposal | Adoption) as current ->
result_error
(Wrong_voting_period_kind
{current; expected = [Exploration; Promotion]})
let check_current_proposal ctxt op_proposal =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let* current_proposal = Vote.get_current_proposal ctxt in
fail_unless
(Protocol_hash.equal op_proposal current_proposal)
(Ballot_for_wrong_proposal
{current = current_proposal; submitted = op_proposal})
let check_source_has_not_already_voted ctxt source =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let*! has_ballot = Vote.has_recorded_ballot ctxt source in
fail_when has_ballot Already_submitted_a_ballot
(** Check that a Ballot operation can be safely applied.
@return [Error Ballot_from_unregistered_delegate] if the source
is not a registered delegate.
@return [Error Wrong_voting_period_index] if the operation's
period and the current period in the {!type:context} do not have
the same index.
@return [Error Wrong_voting_period_kind] if the voting period is
not of the Exploration or Promotion kind.
@return [Error Ballot_for_wrong_proposal] if the operation's
proposal is different from the current proposal in the context.
@return [Error Already_submitted_a_ballot] if the source has
already voted during the current voting period.
@return [Error Source_not_in_vote_listings] if the source is not
in the vote listings.
@return [Error Operation.Missing_signature] or [Error
Operation.Invalid_signature] if the operation is unsigned or
incorrectly signed. *)
let check_ballot vi ~check_signature (operation : Kind.ballot operation) =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let (Single (Ballot {source; period; proposal; ballot = _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let* () = check_ballot_source_is_registered vi.ctxt source in
let* current_period = Voting_period.get_current vi.ctxt in
let*? () = check_period_index ~expected:current_period.index period in
let*? () = check_period_kind_for_ballot current_period in
let* () = check_current_proposal vi.ctxt proposal in
let* () = check_source_has_not_already_voted vi.ctxt source in
let* () = check_in_listings vi.ctxt source in
when_ check_signature (fun () ->
let* public_key = Contract.get_manager_key vi.ctxt source in
Lwt.return (Operation.check_signature public_key vi.chain_id operation))
(** Check that a Ballot operation is compatible with previously
validated operations in the current block/mempool.
@return [Error Operation_conflict] if the current block/mempool
already contains a Ballot operation from the same source. *)
let check_ballot_conflict vs oph (operation : Kind.ballot operation) =
let (Single (Ballot {source; _})) = operation.protocol_data.contents in
match
Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.find_opt source vs.voting_state.ballots_seen
with
| None -> ok_unit
| Some existing ->
Error (Operation_conflict {existing; new_operation = oph})
let wrap_ballot_conflict = function
| Ok () -> ok_unit
| Error conflict -> result_error (Conflicting_ballot conflict)
let add_ballot vs oph (operation : Kind.ballot operation) =
let (Single (Ballot {source; _})) = operation.protocol_data.contents in
let ballots_seen =
Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.add source oph vs.voting_state.ballots_seen
in
let voting_state = {vs.voting_state with ballots_seen} in
{vs with voting_state}
let remove_ballot vs (operation : Kind.ballot operation) =
let (Single (Ballot {source; _})) = operation.protocol_data.contents in
let ballots_seen =
Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.remove source vs.voting_state.ballots_seen
in
{vs with voting_state = {vs.voting_state with ballots_seen}}
end
module Anonymous = struct
open Validate_errors.Anonymous
let check_activate_account vi (operation : Kind.activate_account operation) =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let (Single (Activate_account {id = edpkh; activation_code})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let blinded_pkh =
Blinded_public_key_hash.of_ed25519_pkh activation_code edpkh
in
let*! exists = Commitment.exists vi.ctxt blinded_pkh in
let*? () = error_unless exists (Invalid_activation {pkh = edpkh}) in
return_unit
let check_activate_account_conflict vs oph
(operation : Kind.activate_account operation) =
let (Single (Activate_account {id = edpkh; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
match
Ed25519.Public_key_hash.Map.find_opt
edpkh
vs.anonymous_state.activation_pkhs_seen
with
| None -> ok_unit
| Some existing ->
Error (Operation_conflict {existing; new_operation = oph})
let wrap_activate_account_conflict
(operation : Kind.activate_account operation) = function
| Ok () -> ok_unit
| Error conflict ->
let (Single (Activate_account {id = edpkh; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
result_error (Conflicting_activation {edpkh; conflict})
let add_activate_account vs oph (operation : Kind.activate_account operation)
=
let (Single (Activate_account {id = edpkh; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let activation_pkhs_seen =
Ed25519.Public_key_hash.Map.add
edpkh
oph
vs.anonymous_state.activation_pkhs_seen
in
{vs with anonymous_state = {vs.anonymous_state with activation_pkhs_seen}}
let remove_activate_account vs (operation : Kind.activate_account operation) =
let (Single (Activate_account {id = edpkh; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let activation_pkhs_seen =
Ed25519.Public_key_hash.Map.remove
edpkh
vs.anonymous_state.activation_pkhs_seen
in
{vs with anonymous_state = {vs.anonymous_state with activation_pkhs_seen}}
let check_denunciation_age vi kind given_level =
let open Result_syntax in
let current_cycle = vi.current_level.cycle in
let given_cycle = (Level.from_raw vi.ctxt given_level).cycle in
let max_slashing_period = Constants.max_slashing_period in
let last_slashable_cycle = Cycle.add given_cycle max_slashing_period in
let* () =
error_unless
Cycle.(given_cycle <= current_cycle)
(Too_early_denunciation
{kind; level = given_level; current = vi.current_level.level})
in
error_unless
Cycle.(last_slashable_cycle > current_cycle)
(Outdated_denunciation
{kind; level = given_level; last_cycle = last_slashable_cycle})
let check_double_attesting_evidence (type kind) vi
(op1 : kind Kind.consensus Operation.t)
(op2 : kind Kind.consensus Operation.t) =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let e1, e2, kind =
match (op1.protocol_data.contents, op2.protocol_data.contents) with
| Single (Preattestation e1), Single (Preattestation e2) ->
(e1, e2, Misbehaviour.Double_preattesting)
| ( Single (Attestation {consensus_content = e1; dal_content = _}),
Single (Attestation {consensus_content = e2; dal_content = _}) ) ->
(e1, e2, Double_attesting)
in
let op1_hash = Operation.hash op1 in
let op2_hash = Operation.hash op2 in
let same_levels = Raw_level.(e1.level = e2.level) in
let same_rounds = Round.(e1.round = e2.round) in
let same_payload =
Block_payload_hash.(e1.block_payload_hash = e2.block_payload_hash)
in
let same_branches = Block_hash.(op1.shell.branch = op2.shell.branch) in
let same_slots = Slot.(e1.slot = e2.slot) in
let ordered_hashes = Operation_hash.(op1_hash < op2_hash) in
let is_denunciation_consistent =
same_levels && same_rounds
&& ((not same_payload) || (not same_branches) || not same_slots)
&&
ordered_hashes
in
let*? () =
error_unless is_denunciation_consistent (Invalid_denunciation kind)
in
let level = Level.from_raw vi.ctxt e1.level in
let*? () = check_denunciation_age vi kind level.level in
let* ctxt, consensus_key1 =
Stake_distribution.slot_owner vi.ctxt level e1.slot
in
let* ctxt, consensus_key2 =
Stake_distribution.slot_owner ctxt level e2.slot
in
let delegate1, delegate2 =
(consensus_key1.delegate, consensus_key2.delegate)
in
let*? () =
error_unless
(Signature.Public_key_hash.equal delegate1 delegate2)
(Inconsistent_denunciation {kind; delegate1; delegate2})
in
let delegate_pk, delegate = (consensus_key1.consensus_pk, delegate1) in
let* already_slashed =
Delegate.already_denounced ctxt delegate level e1.round kind
in
let*? () =
error_unless
(not already_slashed)
(Already_denounced {kind; delegate; level})
in
let*? () = Operation.check_signature delegate_pk vi.chain_id op1 in
let*? () = Operation.check_signature delegate_pk vi.chain_id op2 in
return_unit
let check_double_preattestation_evidence vi
(operation : Kind.double_preattestation_evidence operation) =
let (Single (Double_preattestation_evidence {op1; op2})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
check_double_attesting_evidence vi op1 op2
let check_double_attestation_evidence vi
(operation : Kind.double_attestation_evidence operation) =
let (Single (Double_attestation_evidence {op1; op2})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
check_double_attesting_evidence vi op1 op2
let double_operation_conflict_key (type kind)
(op1 : kind Kind.consensus Operation.t) =
let {slot; level; round; block_payload_hash = _}, kind =
match op1.protocol_data.contents with
| Single (Preattestation cc) -> (cc, Misbehaviour.Double_preattesting)
| Single (Attestation {consensus_content; dal_content = _}) ->
(consensus_content, Double_attesting)
in
(level, round, slot, kind)
let check_double_attesting_evidence_conflict (type kind) vs oph
(op1 : kind Kind.consensus Operation.t) =
match
Double_operation_evidence_map.find
(double_operation_conflict_key op1)
vs.anonymous_state.double_attesting_evidences_seen
with
| None -> ok_unit
| Some existing ->
Error (Operation_conflict {existing; new_operation = oph})
let check_double_preattestation_evidence_conflict vs oph
(operation : Kind.double_preattestation_evidence operation) =
let (Single (Double_preattestation_evidence {op1; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
check_double_attesting_evidence_conflict vs oph op1
let check_double_attestation_evidence_conflict vs oph
(operation : Kind.double_attestation_evidence operation) =
let (Single (Double_attestation_evidence {op1; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
check_double_attesting_evidence_conflict vs oph op1
let wrap_denunciation_conflict kind = function
| Ok () -> ok_unit
| Error conflict -> result_error (Conflicting_denunciation {kind; conflict})
let add_double_attesting_evidence (type kind) vs oph
(op1 : kind Kind.consensus Operation.t) =
let double_attesting_evidences_seen =
Double_operation_evidence_map.add
(double_operation_conflict_key op1)
oph
vs.anonymous_state.double_attesting_evidences_seen
in
{
vs with
anonymous_state =
{vs.anonymous_state with double_attesting_evidences_seen};
}
let add_double_attestation_evidence vs oph
(operation : Kind.double_attestation_evidence operation) =
let (Single (Double_attestation_evidence {op1; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
add_double_attesting_evidence vs oph op1
let add_double_preattestation_evidence vs oph
(operation : Kind.double_preattestation_evidence operation) =
let (Single (Double_preattestation_evidence {op1; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
add_double_attesting_evidence vs oph op1
let remove_double_attesting_evidence (type kind) vs
(op : kind Kind.consensus Operation.t) =
let double_attesting_evidences_seen =
Double_operation_evidence_map.remove
(double_operation_conflict_key op)
vs.anonymous_state.double_attesting_evidences_seen
in
let anonymous_state =
{vs.anonymous_state with double_attesting_evidences_seen}
in
{vs with anonymous_state}
let remove_double_preattestation_evidence vs
(operation : Kind.double_preattestation_evidence operation) =
let (Single (Double_preattestation_evidence {op1; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
remove_double_attesting_evidence vs op1
let remove_double_attestation_evidence vs
(operation : Kind.double_attestation_evidence operation) =
let (Single (Double_attestation_evidence {op1; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
remove_double_attesting_evidence vs op1
let check_double_baking_evidence vi
(operation : Kind.double_baking_evidence operation) =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let (Single (Double_baking_evidence {bh1; bh2})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let hash1 = Block_header.hash bh1 in
let hash2 = Block_header.hash bh2 in
let*? bh1_fitness = Fitness.from_raw bh1.shell.fitness in
let round1 = Fitness.round bh1_fitness in
let*? bh2_fitness = Fitness.from_raw bh2.shell.fitness in
let round2 = Fitness.round bh2_fitness in
let*? level1 = Raw_level.of_int32 bh1.shell.level in
let*? level2 = Raw_level.of_int32 bh2.shell.level in
let*? () =
error_unless
(Raw_level.(level1 = level2)
&& Round.(round1 = round2)
&&
Block_hash.(hash1 < hash2))
(Invalid_double_baking_evidence
{hash1; level1; round1; hash2; level2; round2})
in
let*? () = check_denunciation_age vi Double_baking level1 in
let level = Level.from_raw vi.ctxt level1 in
let committee_size = Constants.consensus_committee_size vi.ctxt in
let*? slot1 = Round.to_slot round1 ~committee_size in
let* ctxt, consensus_key1 =
Stake_distribution.slot_owner vi.ctxt level slot1
in
let*? slot2 = Round.to_slot round2 ~committee_size in
let* ctxt, consensus_key2 =
Stake_distribution.slot_owner ctxt level slot2
in
let delegate1, delegate2 =
(consensus_key1.delegate, consensus_key2.delegate)
in
let*? () =
error_unless
Signature.Public_key_hash.(delegate1 = delegate2)
(Inconsistent_denunciation {kind = Double_baking; delegate1; delegate2})
in
let delegate_pk, delegate = (consensus_key1.consensus_pk, delegate1) in
let* already_slashed =
Delegate.already_denounced ctxt delegate level round1 Double_baking
in
let*? () =
error_unless
(not already_slashed)
(Already_denounced {kind = Double_baking; delegate; level})
in
let*? () = Block_header.check_signature bh1 vi.chain_id delegate_pk in
let*? () = Block_header.check_signature bh2 vi.chain_id delegate_pk in
return_unit
let check_double_baking_evidence_conflict vs oph
(operation : Kind.double_baking_evidence operation) =
let (Single (Double_baking_evidence {bh1; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let bh1_fitness =
Fitness.from_raw bh1.shell.fitness |> function
| Ok f -> f
| Error _ ->
assert false
in
let round = Fitness.round bh1_fitness in
let level = Fitness.level bh1_fitness in
match
Double_baking_evidence_map.find
(level, round)
vs.anonymous_state.double_baking_evidences_seen
with
| None -> ok_unit
| Some existing ->
Error (Operation_conflict {existing; new_operation = oph})
let add_double_baking_evidence vs oph
(operation : Kind.double_baking_evidence operation) =
let (Single (Double_baking_evidence {bh1; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let bh1_fitness =
Fitness.from_raw bh1.shell.fitness |> function
| Ok f -> f
| Error _ -> assert false
in
let round = Fitness.round bh1_fitness in
let level = Fitness.level bh1_fitness in
let double_baking_evidences_seen =
Double_baking_evidence_map.add
(level, round)
oph
vs.anonymous_state.double_baking_evidences_seen
in
{
vs with
anonymous_state = {vs.anonymous_state with double_baking_evidences_seen};
}
let remove_double_baking_evidence vs
(operation : Kind.double_baking_evidence operation) =
let (Single (Double_baking_evidence {bh1; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let bh1_fitness, level =
match
(Fitness.from_raw bh1.shell.fitness, Raw_level.of_int32 bh1.shell.level)
with
| Ok v, Ok v' -> (v, v')
| _ ->
assert false
in
let round = Fitness.round bh1_fitness in
let double_baking_evidences_seen =
Double_baking_evidence_map.remove
(level, round)
vs.anonymous_state.double_baking_evidences_seen
in
let anonymous_state =
{vs.anonymous_state with double_baking_evidences_seen}
in
{vs with anonymous_state}
let check_drain_delegate info ~check_signature
(operation : Kind.drain_delegate Operation.t) =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let (Single (Drain_delegate {delegate; destination; consensus_key})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let*! is_registered = Delegate.registered info.ctxt delegate in
let* () =
fail_unless
is_registered
(Drain_delegate_on_unregistered_delegate delegate)
in
let* active_pk = Delegate.Consensus_key.active_pubkey info.ctxt delegate in
let* () =
fail_unless
(Signature.Public_key_hash.equal active_pk.consensus_pkh consensus_key)
(Invalid_drain_delegate_inactive_key
{
delegate;
consensus_key;
active_consensus_key = active_pk.consensus_pkh;
})
in
let* () =
fail_when
(Signature.Public_key_hash.equal active_pk.consensus_pkh delegate)
(Invalid_drain_delegate_no_consensus_key delegate)
in
let* () =
fail_when
(Signature.Public_key_hash.equal destination delegate)
(Invalid_drain_delegate_noop delegate)
in
let*! is_destination_allocated =
Contract.allocated info.ctxt (Contract.Implicit destination)
in
let* balance =
Contract.get_balance info.ctxt (Contract.Implicit delegate)
in
let*? origination_burn =
if is_destination_allocated then Ok Tez.zero
else
let cost_per_byte = Constants.cost_per_byte info.ctxt in
let origination_size = Constants.origination_size info.ctxt in
Tez.(cost_per_byte *? Int64.of_int origination_size)
in
let* drain_fees =
let*? one_percent = Tez.(balance /? 100L) in
return Tez.(max one one_percent)
in
let*? min_amount = Tez.(origination_burn +? drain_fees) in
let* () =
fail_when
Tez.(balance < min_amount)
(Invalid_drain_delegate_insufficient_funds_for_burn_or_fees
{delegate; destination; min_amount})
in
let*? () =
if check_signature then
Operation.check_signature active_pk.consensus_pk info.chain_id operation
else ok_unit
in
return_unit
let check_drain_delegate_conflict state oph
(operation : Kind.drain_delegate Operation.t) =
let (Single (Drain_delegate {delegate; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
match
Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.find_opt
delegate
state.manager_state.managers_seen
with
| None -> ok_unit
| Some existing ->
Error (Operation_conflict {existing; new_operation = oph})
let wrap_drain_delegate_conflict (operation : Kind.drain_delegate Operation.t)
=
let (Single (Drain_delegate {delegate; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
function
| Ok () -> ok_unit
| Error conflict ->
result_error (Conflicting_drain_delegate {delegate; conflict})
let add_drain_delegate state oph (operation : Kind.drain_delegate Operation.t)
=
let (Single (Drain_delegate {delegate; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let managers_seen =
Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.add
delegate
oph
state.manager_state.managers_seen
in
{state with manager_state = {managers_seen}}
let remove_drain_delegate state (operation : Kind.drain_delegate Operation.t)
=
let (Single (Drain_delegate {delegate; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let managers_seen =
Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.remove
delegate
state.manager_state.managers_seen
in
{state with manager_state = {managers_seen}}
let check_seed_nonce_revelation vi
(operation : Kind.seed_nonce_revelation operation) =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let (Single (Seed_nonce_revelation {level = commitment_raw_level; nonce})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let commitment_level = Level.from_raw vi.ctxt commitment_raw_level in
let* () = Nonce.check_unrevealed vi.ctxt commitment_level nonce in
return_unit
let check_seed_nonce_revelation_conflict vs oph
(operation : Kind.seed_nonce_revelation operation) =
let (Single (Seed_nonce_revelation {level = commitment_raw_level; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
match
Raw_level.Map.find_opt
commitment_raw_level
vs.anonymous_state.seed_nonce_levels_seen
with
| None -> ok_unit
| Some existing ->
Error (Operation_conflict {existing; new_operation = oph})
let wrap_seed_nonce_revelation_conflict = function
| Ok () -> ok_unit
| Error conflict -> result_error (Conflicting_nonce_revelation conflict)
let add_seed_nonce_revelation vs oph
(operation : Kind.seed_nonce_revelation operation) =
let (Single (Seed_nonce_revelation {level = commitment_raw_level; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let seed_nonce_levels_seen =
Raw_level.Map.add
commitment_raw_level
oph
vs.anonymous_state.seed_nonce_levels_seen
in
let anonymous_state = {vs.anonymous_state with seed_nonce_levels_seen} in
{vs with anonymous_state}
let remove_seed_nonce_revelation vs
(operation : Kind.seed_nonce_revelation operation) =
let (Single (Seed_nonce_revelation {level = commitment_raw_level; _})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let seed_nonce_levels_seen =
Raw_level.Map.remove
commitment_raw_level
vs.anonymous_state.seed_nonce_levels_seen
in
let anonymous_state = {vs.anonymous_state with seed_nonce_levels_seen} in
{vs with anonymous_state}
let check_vdf_revelation vi (operation : Kind.vdf_revelation operation) =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let (Single (Vdf_revelation {solution})) =
operation.protocol_data.contents
in
let* () = Seed.check_vdf vi.ctxt solution in
return_unit
let check_vdf_revelation_conflict vs oph =
match vs.anonymous_state.vdf_solution_seen with
| None -> ok_unit
| Some existing ->
Error (Operation_conflict {existing; new_operation = oph})
let wrap_vdf_revelation_conflict = function
| Ok () -> ok_unit
| Error conflict -> result_error (Conflicting_vdf_revelation conflict)
let add_vdf_revelation vs oph =
{
vs with
anonymous_state = {vs.anonymous_state with vdf_solution_seen = Some oph};
}
let remove_vdf_revelation vs =
let anonymous_state = {vs.anonymous_state with vdf_solution_seen = None} in
{vs with anonymous_state}
end
module Manager = struct
open Validate_errors.Manager
(** State that simulates changes from individual operations that have
an effect on future operations inside the same batch. *)
type batch_state = {
balance : Tez.t;
(** Remaining balance in the contract, used to simulate the
payment of fees by each operation in the batch. *)
is_allocated : bool;
(** Track whether the contract is still allocated. Indeed,
previous operations' fee payment may empty the contract and
this may deallocate the contract.
TODO: https://gitlab.com/tezos/tezos/-/issues/3209 Change
empty account cleanup mechanism to avoid the need for this
field. *)
total_gas_used : Gas.Arith.fp;
}
let check_source_and_counter ~expected_source ~source ~previous_counter
~counter =
let open Result_syntax in
let* () =
error_unless
(Signature.Public_key_hash.equal expected_source source)
Inconsistent_sources
in
error_unless
Manager_counter.(succ previous_counter = counter)
Inconsistent_counters
let rec check_batch_tail_sanity :
type kind.
public_key_hash ->
Manager_counter.t ->
kind Kind.manager contents_list ->
unit tzresult =
let open Result_syntax in
fun expected_source previous_counter -> function
| Single (Manager_operation {operation = Reveal _key; _}) ->
tzfail Incorrect_reveal_position
| Cons (Manager_operation {operation = Reveal _key; _}, _res) ->
tzfail Incorrect_reveal_position
| Single (Manager_operation {source; counter; _}) ->
check_source_and_counter
~expected_source
~source
~previous_counter
~counter
| Cons (Manager_operation {source; counter; _}, rest) ->
let* () =
check_source_and_counter
~expected_source
~source
~previous_counter
~counter
in
check_batch_tail_sanity source counter rest
let check_batch :
type kind.
kind Kind.manager contents_list ->
(public_key_hash * public_key option * Manager_counter.t) tzresult =
let open Result_syntax in
fun contents_list ->
match contents_list with
| Single (Manager_operation {source; operation = Reveal key; counter; _})
->
return (source, Some key, counter)
| Single (Manager_operation {source; counter; _}) ->
return (source, None, counter)
| Cons
(Manager_operation {source; operation = Reveal key; counter; _}, rest)
->
let* () = check_batch_tail_sanity source counter rest in
return (source, Some key, counter)
| Cons (Manager_operation {source; counter; _}, rest) ->
let* () = check_batch_tail_sanity source counter rest in
return (source, None, counter)
(** Check a few simple properties of the batch, and return the
initial {!batch_state} and the contract public key.
Invariants checked:
- All operations in a batch have the same source.
- The source's contract is allocated.
- The counters in a batch are successive, and the first of them
is the source's next expected counter.
- A batch contains at most one Reveal operation that must occur
in first position.
- The source's public key has been revealed (either before the
considered batch, or during its first operation).
Note that currently, the [op] batch contains only one signature,
so all operations in the batch are required to originate from the
same manager. This may change in the future, in order to allow
several managers to group-sign a sequence of operations. *)
let check_sanity_and_find_public_key vi
(contents_list : _ Kind.manager contents_list) =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let*? source, revealed_key, first_counter = check_batch contents_list in
let* balance = Contract.check_allocated_and_get_balance vi.ctxt source in
let* () = Contract.check_counter_increment vi.ctxt source first_counter in
let* pk =
match revealed_key with
| Some pk -> return pk
| None -> Contract.get_manager_key vi.ctxt source
in
let initial_batch_state =
{
balance;
is_allocated = true;
total_gas_used = Gas.Arith.zero;
}
in
return (initial_batch_state, pk)
let check_gas_limit info ~gas_limit =
Gas.check_gas_limit
~hard_gas_limit_per_operation:
info.manager_info.hard_gas_limit_per_operation
~gas_limit
let check_storage_limit vi storage_limit =
error_unless
Compare.Z.(
storage_limit <= vi.manager_info.hard_storage_limit_per_operation
&& storage_limit >= Z.zero)
Fees.Storage_limit_too_high
let assert_pvm_kind_enabled vi kind =
let open Result_syntax in
let* () =
error_when
((not (Constants.sc_rollup_arith_pvm_enable vi.ctxt))
&& Sc_rollup.Kind.(equal kind Example_arith))
Sc_rollup_arith_pvm_disabled
in
error_when
((not (Constants.sc_rollup_riscv_pvm_enable vi.ctxt))
&& Sc_rollup.Kind.(equal kind Riscv))
Sc_rollup_riscv_pvm_disabled
let assert_not_zero_messages messages =
match messages with
| [] -> result_error Sc_rollup_errors.Sc_rollup_add_zero_messages
| _ -> ok_unit
let assert_zk_rollup_feature_enabled vi =
error_unless (Constants.zk_rollup_enable vi.ctxt) Zk_rollup_feature_disabled
let consume_decoding_gas remaining_gas lexpr =
record_trace Gas_quota_exceeded_init_deserialize
@@
Script.consume_decoding_gas remaining_gas lexpr
let may_trace_gas_limit_too_high info =
match info.mode with
| Application _ | Partial_validation _ | Construction _ -> fun x -> x
| Mempool ->
record_trace Gas.Gas_limit_too_high
let check_kind_specific_content (type kind)
(contents : kind Kind.manager contents) remaining_gas vi =
let open Result_syntax in
let (Manager_operation
{
source;
fee = _;
counter = _;
operation;
gas_limit = _;
storage_limit = _;
}) =
contents
in
match operation with
| Reveal pk -> Contract.check_public_key pk source
| Transaction {parameters; _} ->
let* (_ : Gas.Arith.fp) =
consume_decoding_gas remaining_gas parameters
in
return_unit
| Origination {script; _} ->
let* remaining_gas = consume_decoding_gas remaining_gas script.code in
let* (_ : Gas.Arith.fp) =
consume_decoding_gas remaining_gas script.storage
in
return_unit
| Register_global_constant {value} ->
let* (_ : Gas.Arith.fp) = consume_decoding_gas remaining_gas value in
return_unit
| Delegation (Some pkh) -> Delegate.check_not_tz4 pkh
| Update_consensus_key pk -> Delegate.Consensus_key.check_not_tz4 pk
| Delegation None | Set_deposits_limit _ | Increase_paid_storage _ ->
return_unit
| Transfer_ticket {contents; ty; _} ->
let* remaining_gas = consume_decoding_gas remaining_gas contents in
let* (_ : Gas.Arith.fp) = consume_decoding_gas remaining_gas ty in
return_unit
| Sc_rollup_originate {kind; _} -> assert_pvm_kind_enabled vi kind
| Sc_rollup_add_messages {messages; _} -> assert_not_zero_messages messages
| Sc_rollup_cement _ | Sc_rollup_publish _ | Sc_rollup_refute _
| Sc_rollup_timeout _ | Sc_rollup_execute_outbox_message _
| Sc_rollup_recover_bond _ ->
return_unit
| Dal_publish_commitment ->
Dal_apply.validate_publish_commitment vi.ctxt slot_header
| Zk_rollup_origination _ | Zk_rollup_publish _ | Zk_rollup_update _ ->
assert_zk_rollup_feature_enabled vi
let check_contents (type kind) vi batch_state
(contents : kind Kind.manager contents) ~consume_gas_for_sig_check
remaining_block_gas =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let (Manager_operation
{source; fee; counter = _; operation = _; gas_limit; storage_limit}) =
contents
in
let*? () = check_gas_limit vi ~gas_limit in
let total_gas_used =
Gas.Arith.(add batch_state.total_gas_used (fp gas_limit))
in
let*? () =
may_trace_gas_limit_too_high vi
@@ error_unless
Gas.Arith.(fp total_gas_used <= remaining_block_gas)
Gas.Block_quota_exceeded
in
let fixed_gas_cost =
let manager_op_cost = Michelson_v1_gas.Cost_of.manager_operation in
match consume_gas_for_sig_check with
| None -> manager_op_cost
| Some gas_for_sig_check -> Gas.(manager_op_cost +@ gas_for_sig_check)
in
let*? remaining_gas =
record_trace
Insufficient_gas_for_manager
(Gas.consume_from (Gas.Arith.fp gas_limit) fixed_gas_cost)
in
let*? () = check_storage_limit vi storage_limit in
let*? () =
error_unless
batch_state.is_allocated
(Contract_storage.Empty_implicit_contract source)
in
let*? () = check_kind_specific_content contents remaining_gas vi in
let* balance, is_allocated =
Contract.simulate_spending
vi.ctxt
~balance:batch_state.balance
~amount:fee
source
in
return {total_gas_used; balance; is_allocated}
(** This would be [fold_left_es (check_contents vi) batch_state
contents_list] if [contents_list] were an ordinary [list]. The
[consume_gas_for_sig_check] arg indicates whether or not gas for
checking the signature of the batch should be consumed; it is
[None] if the cost has already been consumed and [Some cost] if
the cost to be consumed is [cost] and remains to be
consumed. This cost is consumed in the first operation of the
batch. *)
let rec check_contents_list :
type kind.
info ->
batch_state ->
kind Kind.manager contents_list ->
consume_gas_for_sig_check:Gas.cost option ->
Gas.Arith.fp ->
Gas.Arith.fp tzresult Lwt.t =
fun vi batch_state contents_list ~consume_gas_for_sig_check remaining_gas ->
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
match contents_list with
| Single contents ->
let* batch_state =
check_contents
vi
batch_state
contents
~consume_gas_for_sig_check
remaining_gas
in
return batch_state.total_gas_used
| Cons (contents, tail) ->
let* batch_state =
check_contents
vi
batch_state
contents
~consume_gas_for_sig_check
remaining_gas
in
check_contents_list
vi
batch_state
tail
~consume_gas_for_sig_check:None
remaining_gas
let check_manager_operation vi ~check_signature
(operation : _ Kind.manager operation) remaining_block_gas =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let contents_list = operation.protocol_data.contents in
let* batch_state, source_pk =
check_sanity_and_find_public_key vi contents_list
in
let signature_checking_gas_cost =
Operation_costs.check_signature_cost
(Michelson_v1_gas.Cost_of.Interpreter.algo_of_public_key source_pk)
operation
in
let* gas_used =
check_contents_list
vi
batch_state
contents_list
~consume_gas_for_sig_check:(Some signature_checking_gas_cost)
remaining_block_gas
in
let*? () =
if check_signature then
Operation.check_signature source_pk vi.chain_id operation
else ok_unit
in
return gas_used
let check_manager_operation_conflict (type kind) vs oph
(operation : kind Kind.manager operation) =
let source =
match operation.protocol_data.contents with
| Single (Manager_operation {source; _})
| Cons (Manager_operation {source; _}, _) ->
source
in
match
Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.find_opt
source
vs.manager_state.managers_seen
with
| None -> ok_unit
| Some existing ->
Error (Operation_conflict {existing; new_operation = oph})
let wrap_check_manager_operation_conflict (type kind)
(operation : kind Kind.manager operation) =
let source =
match operation.protocol_data.contents with
| Single (Manager_operation {source; _})
| Cons (Manager_operation {source; _}, _) ->
source
in
function
| Ok () -> ok_unit
| Error conflict -> result_error (Manager_restriction {source; conflict})
let add_manager_operation (type kind) vs oph
(operation : kind Kind.manager operation) =
let source =
match operation.protocol_data.contents with
| Single (Manager_operation {source; _})
| Cons (Manager_operation {source; _}, _) ->
source
in
let managers_seen =
Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.add
source
oph
vs.manager_state.managers_seen
in
{vs with manager_state = {managers_seen}}
let may_update_remaining_gas_used mode (block_state : block_state)
operation_gas_used =
match mode with
| Application _ | Partial_validation _ | Construction _ ->
let remaining_block_gas =
Gas.Arith.(sub block_state.remaining_block_gas operation_gas_used)
in
{block_state with remaining_block_gas}
| Mempool -> block_state
let remove_manager_operation (type kind) vs
(operation : kind Kind.manager operation) =
let source =
match operation.protocol_data.contents with
| Single (Manager_operation {source; _})
| Cons (Manager_operation {source; _}, _) ->
source
in
let managers_seen =
Signature.Public_key_hash.Map.remove source vs.manager_state.managers_seen
in
{vs with manager_state = {managers_seen}}
let validate_manager_operation ~check_signature info operation_state
block_state oph operation =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let* gas_used =
check_manager_operation
info
~check_signature
operation
block_state.remaining_block_gas
in
let*? () =
check_manager_operation_conflict operation_state oph operation
|> wrap_check_manager_operation_conflict operation
in
let operation_state = add_manager_operation operation_state oph operation in
let block_state =
may_update_remaining_gas_used info.mode block_state gas_used
in
return {info; operation_state; block_state}
end
let init_validation_state ctxt mode chain_id ~predecessor_level_and_round =
let info = init_info ctxt mode chain_id ~predecessor_level_and_round in
let operation_state = empty_operation_conflict_state in
let block_state = init_block_state info in
{info; operation_state; block_state}
let begin_any_application ctxt chain_id ~predecessor_level
~predecessor_timestamp ( : Block_header.t) fitness ~is_partial =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let predecessor_round = Fitness.predecessor_round fitness in
let round = Fitness.round fitness in
let current_level = Level.current ctxt in
let* ctxt, _slot, block_producer =
Stake_distribution.baking_rights_owner ctxt current_level ~round
in
let*? () =
Block_header.begin_validate_block_header
~block_header
~chain_id
~predecessor_timestamp
~predecessor_round
~fitness
~timestamp:block_header.shell.timestamp
~delegate_pk:block_producer.consensus_pk
~round_durations:(Constants.round_durations ctxt)
~proof_of_work_threshold:(Constants.proof_of_work_threshold ctxt)
~expected_commitment:current_level.expected_commitment
in
let* () =
Consensus.check_delegate_is_not_forbidden ctxt block_producer.delegate
in
let* ctxt, _slot, _payload_producer =
Stake_distribution.baking_rights_owner
ctxt
current_level
~round:block_header.protocol_data.contents.payload_round
in
let predecessor_hash = block_header.shell.predecessor in
let block_info =
{
round;
locked_round = Fitness.locked_round fitness;
predecessor_hash;
header_contents = block_header.protocol_data.contents;
}
in
let mode =
if is_partial then Partial_validation block_info else Application block_info
in
let validation_state =
init_validation_state
ctxt
mode
chain_id
~predecessor_level_and_round:
(Some (predecessor_level.Level.level, predecessor_round))
in
return validation_state
let begin_partial_validation ctxt chain_id ~predecessor_level
~predecessor_timestamp fitness =
begin_any_application
ctxt
chain_id
~predecessor_level
~predecessor_timestamp
block_header
fitness
~is_partial:true
let begin_application ctxt chain_id ~predecessor_level ~predecessor_timestamp
fitness =
begin_any_application
ctxt
chain_id
~predecessor_level
~predecessor_timestamp
block_header
fitness
~is_partial:false
let begin_full_construction ctxt chain_id ~predecessor_level ~predecessor_round
~predecessor_timestamp ~predecessor_hash round
( : Block_header.contents) =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let round_durations = Constants.round_durations ctxt in
let timestamp = Timestamp.current ctxt in
let*? () =
Block_header.check_timestamp
round_durations
~timestamp
~round
~predecessor_timestamp
~predecessor_round
in
let current_level = Level.current ctxt in
let* ctxt, _slot, block_producer =
Stake_distribution.baking_rights_owner ctxt current_level ~round
in
let* () =
Consensus.check_delegate_is_not_forbidden ctxt block_producer.delegate
in
let* ctxt, _slot, _payload_producer =
Stake_distribution.baking_rights_owner
ctxt
current_level
~round:header_contents.payload_round
in
let validation_state =
init_validation_state
ctxt
(Construction {round; predecessor_hash; header_contents})
chain_id
~predecessor_level_and_round:
(Some (predecessor_level.Level.level, predecessor_round))
in
return validation_state
let begin_partial_construction ctxt chain_id ~predecessor_level
~predecessor_round =
let validation_state =
init_validation_state
ctxt
Mempool
chain_id
~predecessor_level_and_round:
(Some (predecessor_level.Level.level, predecessor_round))
in
validation_state
let begin_no_predecessor_info ctxt chain_id =
init_validation_state ctxt Mempool chain_id ~predecessor_level_and_round:None
let check_operation ?(check_signature = true) info (type kind)
(operation : kind operation) : unit tzresult Lwt.t =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
match operation.protocol_data.contents with
| Single (Preattestation _) ->
let* (_voting_power : int) =
Consensus.check_preattestation info ~check_signature operation
in
return_unit
| Single (Attestation _) ->
let* (_voting_power : int) =
Consensus.check_attestation info ~check_signature operation
in
return_unit
| Single (Proposals _) ->
Voting.check_proposals info ~check_signature operation
| Single (Ballot _) -> Voting.check_ballot info ~check_signature operation
| Single (Activate_account _) ->
Anonymous.check_activate_account info operation
| Single (Double_preattestation_evidence _) ->
Anonymous.check_double_preattestation_evidence info operation
| Single (Double_attestation_evidence _) ->
Anonymous.check_double_attestation_evidence info operation
| Single (Double_baking_evidence _) ->
Anonymous.check_double_baking_evidence info operation
| Single (Drain_delegate _) ->
Anonymous.check_drain_delegate info ~check_signature operation
| Single (Seed_nonce_revelation _) ->
Anonymous.check_seed_nonce_revelation info operation
| Single (Vdf_revelation _) -> Anonymous.check_vdf_revelation info operation
| Single (Manager_operation _) ->
let remaining_gas =
Gas.Arith.fp (Constants.hard_gas_limit_per_block info.ctxt)
in
let* (_remaining_gas : Gas.Arith.fp) =
Manager.check_manager_operation
info
~check_signature
operation
remaining_gas
in
return_unit
| Cons (Manager_operation _, _) ->
let remaining_gas =
Gas.Arith.fp (Constants.hard_gas_limit_per_block info.ctxt)
in
let* (_remaining_gas : Gas.Arith.fp) =
Manager.check_manager_operation
info
~check_signature
operation
remaining_gas
in
return_unit
| Single (Failing_noop _) -> tzfail Validate_errors.Failing_noop_error
let check_operation_conflict (type kind) operation_conflict_state oph
(operation : kind operation) =
match operation.protocol_data.contents with
| Single (Preattestation _) ->
Consensus.check_preattestation_conflict
operation_conflict_state
oph
operation
| Single (Attestation _) ->
Consensus.check_attestation_conflict
operation_conflict_state
oph
operation
| Single (Proposals _) ->
Voting.check_proposals_conflict operation_conflict_state oph operation
| Single (Ballot _) ->
Voting.check_ballot_conflict operation_conflict_state oph operation
| Single (Activate_account _) ->
Anonymous.check_activate_account_conflict
operation_conflict_state
oph
operation
| Single (Double_preattestation_evidence _) ->
Anonymous.check_double_preattestation_evidence_conflict
operation_conflict_state
oph
operation
| Single (Double_attestation_evidence _) ->
Anonymous.check_double_attestation_evidence_conflict
operation_conflict_state
oph
operation
| Single (Double_baking_evidence _) ->
Anonymous.check_double_baking_evidence_conflict
operation_conflict_state
oph
operation
| Single (Drain_delegate _) ->
Anonymous.check_drain_delegate_conflict
operation_conflict_state
oph
operation
| Single (Seed_nonce_revelation _) ->
Anonymous.check_seed_nonce_revelation_conflict
operation_conflict_state
oph
operation
| Single (Vdf_revelation _) ->
Anonymous.check_vdf_revelation_conflict operation_conflict_state oph
| Single (Manager_operation _) ->
Manager.check_manager_operation_conflict
operation_conflict_state
oph
operation
| Cons (Manager_operation _, _) ->
Manager.check_manager_operation_conflict
operation_conflict_state
oph
operation
| Single (Failing_noop _) -> ok_unit
let add_valid_operation operation_conflict_state oph (type kind)
(operation : kind operation) =
match operation.protocol_data.contents with
| Single (Preattestation _) ->
Consensus.add_preattestation operation_conflict_state oph operation
| Single (Attestation _) ->
Consensus.add_attestation operation_conflict_state oph operation
| Single (Proposals _) ->
Voting.add_proposals operation_conflict_state oph operation
| Single (Ballot _) ->
Voting.add_ballot operation_conflict_state oph operation
| Single (Activate_account _) ->
Anonymous.add_activate_account operation_conflict_state oph operation
| Single (Double_preattestation_evidence _) ->
Anonymous.add_double_preattestation_evidence
operation_conflict_state
oph
operation
| Single (Double_attestation_evidence _) ->
Anonymous.add_double_attestation_evidence
operation_conflict_state
oph
operation
| Single (Double_baking_evidence _) ->
Anonymous.add_double_baking_evidence
operation_conflict_state
oph
operation
| Single (Drain_delegate _) ->
Anonymous.add_drain_delegate operation_conflict_state oph operation
| Single (Seed_nonce_revelation _) ->
Anonymous.add_seed_nonce_revelation operation_conflict_state oph operation
| Single (Vdf_revelation _) ->
Anonymous.add_vdf_revelation operation_conflict_state oph
| Single (Manager_operation _) ->
Manager.add_manager_operation operation_conflict_state oph operation
| Cons (Manager_operation _, _) ->
Manager.add_manager_operation operation_conflict_state oph operation
| Single (Failing_noop _) -> operation_conflict_state
let remove_operation operation_conflict_state (type kind)
(operation : kind operation) =
match operation.protocol_data.contents with
| Single (Preattestation _) ->
Consensus.remove_preattestation operation_conflict_state operation
| Single (Attestation _) ->
Consensus.remove_attestation operation_conflict_state operation
| Single (Proposals _) ->
Voting.remove_proposals operation_conflict_state operation
| Single (Ballot _) -> Voting.remove_ballot operation_conflict_state operation
| Single (Activate_account _) ->
Anonymous.remove_activate_account operation_conflict_state operation
| Single (Double_preattestation_evidence _) ->
Anonymous.remove_double_preattestation_evidence
operation_conflict_state
operation
| Single (Double_attestation_evidence _) ->
Anonymous.remove_double_attestation_evidence
operation_conflict_state
operation
| Single (Double_baking_evidence _) ->
Anonymous.remove_double_baking_evidence operation_conflict_state operation
| Single (Drain_delegate _) ->
Anonymous.remove_drain_delegate operation_conflict_state operation
| Single (Seed_nonce_revelation _) ->
Anonymous.remove_seed_nonce_revelation operation_conflict_state operation
| Single (Vdf_revelation _) ->
Anonymous.remove_vdf_revelation operation_conflict_state
| Single (Manager_operation _) ->
Manager.remove_manager_operation operation_conflict_state operation
| Cons (Manager_operation _, _) ->
Manager.remove_manager_operation operation_conflict_state operation
| Single (Failing_noop _) -> operation_conflict_state
let check_validation_pass_consistency vi vs validation_pass =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
match vi.mode with
| Mempool | Construction _ -> return vs
| Application _ | Partial_validation _ -> (
match (vs.last_op_validation_pass, validation_pass) with
| None, validation_pass ->
return {vs with last_op_validation_pass = validation_pass}
| Some previous_vp, Some validation_pass ->
let* () =
fail_unless
Compare.Int.(previous_vp <= validation_pass)
(Validate_errors.Block.Inconsistent_validation_passes_in_block
{expected = previous_vp; provided = validation_pass})
in
return {vs with last_op_validation_pass = Some validation_pass}
| Some _, None -> tzfail Validate_errors.Failing_noop_error)
(** Increment [vs.op_count] for all operations, and record
non-consensus operation hashes in [vs.recorded_operations_rev]. *)
let record_operation vs ophash validation_pass_opt =
let op_count = vs.op_count + 1 in
match validation_pass_opt with
| Some n when Compare.Int.(n = Operation_repr.consensus_pass) ->
{vs with op_count}
| _ ->
{
vs with
op_count;
recorded_operations_rev = ophash :: vs.recorded_operations_rev;
}
let validate_operation ?(check_signature = true)
{info; operation_state; block_state} oph
(packed_operation : packed_operation) =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let {shell; protocol_data = Operation_data protocol_data} =
packed_operation
in
let validation_pass_opt = Operation.acceptable_pass packed_operation in
let* block_state =
check_validation_pass_consistency info block_state validation_pass_opt
in
let block_state = record_operation block_state oph validation_pass_opt in
let operation : _ operation = {shell; protocol_data} in
match (info.mode, validation_pass_opt) with
| Partial_validation _, Some n
when Compare.Int.(n <> Operation_repr.consensus_pass) ->
return {info; operation_state; block_state}
| (Application _ | Partial_validation _ | Construction _ | Mempool), _ -> (
match operation.protocol_data.contents with
| Single (Preattestation _) ->
Consensus.validate_preattestation
~check_signature
info
operation_state
block_state
oph
operation
| Single (Attestation _) ->
Consensus.validate_attestation
~check_signature
info
operation_state
block_state
oph
operation
| Single (Proposals _) ->
let open Voting in
let* () = check_proposals info ~check_signature operation in
let*? () =
check_proposals_conflict operation_state oph operation
|> wrap_proposals_conflict
in
let operation_state = add_proposals operation_state oph operation in
return {info; operation_state; block_state}
| Single (Ballot _) ->
let open Voting in
let* () = check_ballot info ~check_signature operation in
let*? () =
check_ballot_conflict operation_state oph operation
|> wrap_ballot_conflict
in
let operation_state = add_ballot operation_state oph operation in
return {info; operation_state; block_state}
| Single (Activate_account _) ->
let open Anonymous in
let* () = check_activate_account info operation in
let*? () =
check_activate_account_conflict operation_state oph operation
|> wrap_activate_account_conflict operation
in
let operation_state =
add_activate_account operation_state oph operation
in
return {info; operation_state; block_state}
| Single (Double_preattestation_evidence _) ->
let open Anonymous in
let* () = check_double_preattestation_evidence info operation in
let*? () =
check_double_preattestation_evidence_conflict
operation_state
oph
operation
|> wrap_denunciation_conflict Double_preattesting
in
let operation_state =
add_double_preattestation_evidence operation_state oph operation
in
return {info; operation_state; block_state}
| Single (Double_attestation_evidence _) ->
let open Anonymous in
let* () = check_double_attestation_evidence info operation in
let*? () =
check_double_attestation_evidence_conflict
operation_state
oph
operation
|> wrap_denunciation_conflict Double_attesting
in
let operation_state =
add_double_attestation_evidence operation_state oph operation
in
return {info; operation_state; block_state}
| Single (Double_baking_evidence _) ->
let open Anonymous in
let* () = check_double_baking_evidence info operation in
let*? () =
check_double_baking_evidence_conflict operation_state oph operation
|> wrap_denunciation_conflict Double_baking
in
let operation_state =
add_double_baking_evidence operation_state oph operation
in
return {info; operation_state; block_state}
| Single (Drain_delegate _) ->
let open Anonymous in
let* () = check_drain_delegate info ~check_signature operation in
let*? () =
check_drain_delegate_conflict operation_state oph operation
|> wrap_drain_delegate_conflict operation
in
let operation_state =
add_drain_delegate operation_state oph operation
in
return {info; operation_state; block_state}
| Single (Seed_nonce_revelation _) ->
let open Anonymous in
let* () = check_seed_nonce_revelation info operation in
let*? () =
check_seed_nonce_revelation_conflict operation_state oph operation
|> wrap_seed_nonce_revelation_conflict
in
let operation_state =
add_seed_nonce_revelation operation_state oph operation
in
return {info; operation_state; block_state}
| Single (Vdf_revelation _) ->
let open Anonymous in
let* () = check_vdf_revelation info operation in
let*? () =
check_vdf_revelation_conflict operation_state oph
|> wrap_vdf_revelation_conflict
in
let operation_state = add_vdf_revelation operation_state oph in
return {info; operation_state; block_state}
| Single (Manager_operation _) ->
Manager.validate_manager_operation
~check_signature
info
operation_state
block_state
oph
operation
| Cons (Manager_operation _, _) ->
Manager.validate_manager_operation
~check_signature
info
operation_state
block_state
oph
operation
| Single (Failing_noop _) -> tzfail Validate_errors.Failing_noop_error)
(** Block finalization *)
open Validate_errors.Block
let check_attestation_power vi bs =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
let* are_attestations_required =
let* first_level_of_protocol = First_level_of_protocol.get vi.ctxt in
let level_position_in_protocol =
Raw_level.diff vi.current_level.level first_level_of_protocol
in
return Compare.Int32.(level_position_in_protocol > 1l)
in
if are_attestations_required then
let required = Constants.consensus_threshold vi.ctxt in
let provided = bs.attestation_power in
fail_unless
Compare.Int.(provided >= required)
(Not_enough_attestations {required; provided})
else return_unit
(** Check that the locked round in the fitness and the locked round
observed in the preattestations are the same.
This check is not called in construction mode because there is
no provided fitness (meaning that we do not know whether the block
should contain any preattestations).
When the observed locked round is [Some _], we actually already
know that it is identical to the fitness locked round, otherwise
{!Consensus.check_preexisting_block_preattestation} would have
rejected the preattestations. But this check is needed to reject
blocks where the fitness locked round has a value yet there are no
preattestations (ie. the observed locked round is [None]). *)
let check_fitness_locked_round bs fitness_locked_round =
let observed_locked_round = Option.map fst bs.locked_round_evidence in
error_unless
(Option.equal Round.equal observed_locked_round fitness_locked_round)
Fitness.Wrong_fitness
(** When there are preattestations, check that they point to a round
before the block's round, and that their total power is high enough.
Note that this function does not check whether the block actually
contains preattestations when they are mandatory. This is checked by
{!check_fitness_locked_round} instead. *)
let check_preattestation_round_and_power vi vs round =
let open Result_syntax in
match vs.locked_round_evidence with
| None -> ok_unit
| Some (preattestation_round, preattestation_count) ->
let* () =
error_when
Round.(preattestation_round >= round)
(Locked_round_after_block_round
{locked_round = preattestation_round; round})
in
let consensus_threshold = Constants.consensus_threshold vi.ctxt in
error_when
Compare.Int.(preattestation_count < consensus_threshold)
(Insufficient_locked_round_evidence
{voting_power = preattestation_count; consensus_threshold})
let check_payload_hash block_state ~predecessor_hash
( : Block_header.contents) =
let expected =
Block_payload.hash
~predecessor_hash
~payload_round:block_header_contents.payload_round
(List.rev block_state.recorded_operations_rev)
in
let provided = block_header_contents.payload_hash in
error_unless
(Block_payload_hash.equal expected provided)
(Invalid_payload_hash {expected; provided})
let finalize_block {info; block_state; _} =
let open Lwt_result_syntax in
match info.mode with
| Application {round; locked_round; predecessor_hash; } ->
let* () = check_attestation_power info block_state in
let*? () = check_fitness_locked_round block_state locked_round in
let*? () = check_preattestation_round_and_power info block_state round in
let*? () =
check_payload_hash block_state ~predecessor_hash header_contents
in
return_unit
| Partial_validation {round; locked_round; _} ->
let* () = check_attestation_power info block_state in
let*? () = check_fitness_locked_round block_state locked_round in
let*? () = check_preattestation_round_and_power info block_state round in
return_unit
| Construction {round; predecessor_hash; } ->
let* () = check_attestation_power info block_state in
let*? () = check_preattestation_round_and_power info block_state round in
let*? () =
match block_state.locked_round_evidence with
| Some _ ->
check_payload_hash block_state ~predecessor_hash header_contents
| None ->
ok_unit
in
return_unit
| Mempool ->
return_unit