package eqaf
Install
Dune Dependency
Authors
Maintainers
Sources
sha256=10e666aea9a413e63c5e9dd1c0566aed78a2bf0f4e09caa2bb3b88a021bf09e0
sha512=38a2687bafb5cd1d1deb51ceceba94fcff9ce88515fd2c61ec1182808c50c0e3373a4d71fe51a17a23c74616c5ab350a4cf7914de656886981538abf2b57ff61
README.md.html
Eq(af) - Constant time equal function
From some crypto libraries like digestif, it needed to have a constant time equal function to avoid timing attacks. To avoid replication of code and ensure maintainability of this kind of function, we decide to provide a little package which implements equal
function on string
.
This package, if cstruct
or base-bigarray
is available, will make this equal
function for them too (as eqaf.cstruct
and eqaf.bigarray
).
Check tool
The main purpose of eqaf
is to test the constant time execution of the equal function. About that, the distribution provide a check
tool which will compute several times how many times we need to execute the equal function on different inputs and equal inputs.
Then, by a linear regression, we compare results and expect that we did not have any difference: the regression coefficient should be close to 0.0
.
You can test eqaf
with this:
$ dune exec check/check.exe
This tool does not have any dependencies to be sure that `eqaf** is self-contained.
Q/A
Q How to update eqaf
implementation?
A eqaf
is fragile where the most important assumption is times needed to compute equal
. So eqaf
provides the check
tool but results from it can be disturb by side-channel (like hypervisor). In a bare-metal environment, check
strictly works and should return 0
.
Q eqaf
is slower than String.compare
, it's possible to optimize it?
A The final goal of eqaf
is to provide a safe equal function. Speed is clearly not what we want where we prefer to provide an implementation which does not leak informations like: where is the first byte which differs between a
and b
.
Q Which attack eqaf
prevents?
A eqaf
provide an equal function to avoid a timing attack. Most of equal or compare functions (like String.compare
) leave at the first byte which differs. A possible attack is to see how long we need to compare two values, like an user input and a password.
Logically, the longer this time is, the more user input is the password. So when we need to compare sensible values (like hashes), we should use something like eqaf
. The distribution provides an example of this attack:
$ dune exec attack/attack.exe
Random: [|218;243;59;121;8;57;151;218;212;91;181;41;|].
471cd8bc03992a31f8f0f0c55e9e477d
471cd8bc03992a31f8f0f0c55e9e477d
The first value is the hash, the second is what we found just by an introspection of time needed by our equal
function.
Q eqaf
provides only equal function on string
?
A The first implementation use string
, then, we copy/paste the code with bigarray
and provide it only if base-bigarray
is available. Finally, we provide an equal
function for cstruct
only if this package is available.
So, it's not only about string
but for some others data-structures.
Q Why we need to do a linear regression to check assumptions on eqaf
?
A As we said, times are noisy by several side-computation (hypervisor, kernel, butterfly...). So, if we record two times how long we spend to compute equal
, we will have 2 different values - close each others but different.
So we need to have a bunch of samples and do an analyze on them to get an approximation. From that, we do 2 analyzes:
get the approximation where we compare 2 same values
get the approximation where we compare 2 different values
From these results, we need to do an other analyze on these approximations to see if they are close each others or not. In the case of eqaf
, it should be the case (and if it is, that means eqaf
does not leak a time information according inputs). In the case of String.compare
, we should have a big difference - and confirm expected behaviors.