package tezos-protocol-017-PtNairob
Tezos protocol 017-PtNairob package
Install
Dune Dependency
Authors
Maintainers
Sources
tezos-octez-v20.1.tag.bz2
sha256=ddfb5076eeb0b32ac21c1eed44e8fc86a6743ef18ab23fff02d36e365bb73d61
sha512=d22a827df5146e0aa274df48bc2150b098177ff7e5eab52c6109e867eb0a1f0ec63e6bfbb0e3645a6c2112de3877c91a17df32ccbff301891ce4ba630c997a65
doc/src/tezos_raw_protocol_017_PtNairob/tx_rollup_l2_verifier.ml.html
Source file tx_rollup_l2_verifier.ml
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197
(*****************************************************************************) (* *) (* Open Source License *) (* Copyright (c) 2022 Nomadic Labs <contact@nomadic-labs.com> *) (* Copyright (c) 2022 Oxhead Alpha <info@oxheadalpha.com> *) (* *) (* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a *) (* copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),*) (* to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation *) (* the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, *) (* and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the *) (* Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: *) (* *) (* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included *) (* in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. *) (* *) (* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR*) (* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, *) (* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL *) (* THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER*) (* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING *) (* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER *) (* DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. *) (* *) (*****************************************************************************) open Tx_rollup_errors_repr open Alpha_context (* {{Note}} This model should be part of [Tx_rollup_gas]. Unfortunately, this is not possible, because this module is defined on top of [Alpha_context], while [Tx_rollup_gas] is defined on top of [Raw_context]. *) let verify_proof_model message_size proof_size = let open Saturation_repr in (* The cost of verifiying the proof depends bilinearly on the size of the message (that is expected to capture the algoritmic complexity of computation to make) and the size of the proof (that is expected to capture the overhead of the storage). *) let proof_size_coeff = safe_int 124 in let message_size_coeff = safe_int 8_416 in let ( * ) = mul in let ( + ) = add in (proof_size_coeff * safe_int proof_size) + (message_size_coeff * safe_int message_size) let consume_verify_proof_cost ctxt ~message_size ~proof_size = let max_proof_size = Alpha_context.Constants.tx_rollup_rejection_max_proof_size ctxt in (* We are interested in having a safe over-approximation of the overhead of the proof interpretation. We have trained the model on data coming from contexts of various “size” (i.e., number of leafs), but there is an edge case when it comes to proof verification that is hard to consider correctly: when the context is empty, the size is ridiculously small, no matter how many transactions are executed. As a safety net, we systematically compute a gas cost as if the proof is at least the big enough to declare the message as invalid (using the [tx_rollup_rejection_max_proof_size] parametric constant). *) Gas.consume ctxt @@ verify_proof_model message_size (Compare.Int.max proof_size max_proof_size) module Verifier_storage : Tx_rollup_l2_storage_sig.STORAGE with type t = Context.tree and type 'a m = ('a, error) result Lwt.t = struct type t = Context.tree type 'a m = ('a, error) result Lwt.t module Syntax = struct let ( let* ) = ( >>=? ) let ( let+ ) = ( >|=? ) let return = return let fail e = Lwt.return (Error e) let catch (m : 'a m) k h = m >>= function Ok x -> k x | Error e -> h e let list_fold_left_m = List.fold_left_es end let path k = [Bytes.to_string k] let get store key = Context.Tree.find store (path key) >>= return let set store key value = Context.Tree.add store (path key) value >>= return let remove store key = Context.Tree.remove store (path key) >>= return end module Verifier_context = Tx_rollup_l2_context.Make (Verifier_storage) module Verifier_apply = Tx_rollup_l2_apply.Make (Verifier_context) let hash_message_result ctxt after withdraw = Tx_rollup_hash.message_result ctxt {context_hash = after; withdraw_list_hash = withdraw} (** [after_hash_when_proof_failed before] produces the {!Alpha_context.Tx_rollup_message_result_hash} expected if a proof failed. That is, the after hash is the same as [before] and it produced zero withdrawals. *) let after_hash_when_proof_failed ctxt before = hash_message_result ctxt before Tx_rollup_withdraw_list_hash.empty let verify_l2_proof proof parameters message = Context.verify_stream_proof proof (fun tree -> Verifier_apply.apply_message tree parameters message >>= function | Ok (tree, (_, withdrawals)) -> Lwt.return (tree, withdrawals) | Error _ -> Lwt.return (tree, [])) (** [compute_proof_after_hash ~max_proof_size agreed proof message] computes the after hash expected while verifying [proof] on [message] starting from [agreed]. Note that if the proof is incorrect this function fails and the commit can not be rejected. *) let compute_proof_after_hash ~proof_length ~max_proof_size ctxt parameters agreed (proof : Tx_rollup_l2_proof.t) message = let message_length = Data_encoding.Binary.length Tx_rollup_message.encoding message in (* When considering “proof large enough to make a batch invalid, even if truncated”, we actually need to take into consideration the size of the message. [max_proof_size] is the upper bound, but we need to make room for the message itself. So the real limit for the proof size is reduced to that end. This way, we save a bit of TPS compared to just having a lower [max_proof_size] constant. *) let max_proof_size = max_proof_size - message_length in let proof_is_too_long = Compare.Int.(proof_length > max_proof_size) in let before = match proof.before with `Node x -> x | `Value x -> x in let agreed_is_correct = Context_hash.(before = agreed) in fail_unless agreed_is_correct (Proof_invalid_before {provided = before; agreed}) >>=? fun () -> consume_verify_proof_cost ctxt ~message_size:message_length ~proof_size:proof_length >>?= fun ctxt -> verify_l2_proof proof parameters message >>= fun res -> match res with | (Ok _ | Error (`Stream_too_short _)) when proof_is_too_long -> (* If the proof is larger than [max_proof_size] we care about 2 cases: - The proof verification succedeed but should not be considered valid since it is larger than the size limit - The proof verification failed because it was truncated but was already larger than the size limit In those two cases, the expected after hash is [after_hash_when_proof_failed] because the correct commitment is "we were not able to apply this message, so after is the same as before" *) after_hash_when_proof_failed ctxt agreed >>?= fun res -> return res | Ok (tree, withdrawals) -> (* The proof is small enough, we compare the computed hash with the committed one *) let tree_hash = Context.Tree.hash tree in Tx_rollup_hash.withdraw_list ctxt withdrawals >>?= fun (ctxt, withdrawals) -> hash_message_result ctxt tree_hash withdrawals >>?= fun res -> return res | Error _ -> (* Finally, the proof verification leads to an internal Irmin error *) tzfail Proof_failed_to_reject let verify_proof ctxt parameters message proof ~proof_length ~(agreed : Tx_rollup_message_result.t) ~rejected ~max_proof_size = compute_proof_after_hash ctxt parameters agreed.context_hash ~proof_length ~max_proof_size proof message >>=? fun (ctxt, computed_result) -> if Alpha_context.Tx_rollup_message_result_hash.(computed_result <> rejected) then return ctxt else tzfail Proof_produced_rejected_state module Internal_for_tests = struct let verify_l2_proof = verify_l2_proof end
sectionYPositions = computeSectionYPositions($el), 10)"
x-init="setTimeout(() => sectionYPositions = computeSectionYPositions($el), 10)"
>